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Abstract
This paper attempts at characterising South Korean monetary policy in the period of 
explicit inflation targeting started in 1999. We explain Korean interest rates in relation 
to an estimated macro-model, assuming that monetary policy is set optimally. This 
allows us to obtain the central bank’s parameters in the policy objective function. 
During the IT regime, the data support that the Bank of Korea pursued optimal policy 
geared towards achieving price stability, with the degree of interest rate smoothing 
being estimated to be considerable. In addition, the central bank loss function is 
estimated to include negligible weights on output and exchange rate variability. 
Keywords: inflation targeting, optimal monetary policy, small open economies, South 
Korea
JEL Classification: E52, E58, E61 
Non-technical summary
In recent years, many countries around the globe have adopted ination tar-
geting (IT) regimes with an explicit goal. This has been the case in advanced
economies for over a decade, as in the experiences of Great Britain, Sweden,
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. In these cases, the new regime was
adopted in the context of exible exchange regimes already in place. More
recently, a large number of emerging market economies (EME) have recently
introduced changes in their monetary and exchange rate policies, moving to
IT frameworks which operate under o¢ cially exible exchange rate regimes.
The present paper aims at characterising Koreas IT regime since it was
launched in 1999. We determine which objectives of the central bank imply
an optimal interest rate path that adequately ts actual movements in the
monetary policy instrument. We bring new evidence to bear on the general
issues concerning IT, such as the role of ination and output stabilisation as
monetary objectives, as well as the role played by interest rate smoothing. In
addition, we investigate whether there are additional issues relating to Koreas
status as both a very open economy and an EME country. In this regard, we
study whether the variability of the exchange rate (for nancial stability rea-
sons or other considerations) has been a concern for the Bank of Korea (BOK).
This is an important issue, given that the desire to stabilise the exchange rate
has the potential to create a conict with other monetary policy goals.
During the Korean IT period, the data are consistent with the BOK pur-
suing optimal policy geared towards achieving price stability. Moreover, the
degree of interest rate smoothing is estimated to have been considerable. The
BOK also appears to have placed a negligible weight on output variability
in setting monetary policy. Our estimate of a much bigger weight on ina-
tion than output in the loss function is broadly in line with Korean monetary
authoritys mandate. These results are consistent with previous studies for
advanced economies, including ination targeters and - outside that class -
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the US.
Our results also shed light on the role of exchange rate variability in Koreas
monetary policymaking. The BOKs estimated objective function is found not
to display any noticeable weight on the exchange rate. However, this would not
prevent the Korean central bank from responding to uctuations in the value
of the won in light of their possible macroeconomic e¤ects. Estimated reac-
tion functions may thus involve an exchange rate term even if the central bank
does not have a specic concern for exchange rate movements. This situation
arises if the exchange rate directly and/or indirectly impacts a variable (such
as ination) that enters the monetary authoritys objective function, thereby
proving a leading indicator of macroeconomic developments that is worth tak-
ing into account. Therefore, the negligible weight that we report for exchange
rate stability is consistent with Eichengreens (2004) nding that the value
of the won enters his estimated monetary policy reaction function for Korea.
This author claims that the communication of Korean monetary policymak-
ing could be more transparent about the role played by the exchange rate.
Judging from our ndings, this variable is a leading indicator of key macro-
economic developments that is worth monitoring. Communication of such role
in relation to targeted objectives could only contribute to enhancing mone-
tary policy credibility. Finally, the absence of a direct concern for exchange
rate variability is consistent with the wons higher exibility observed during
the IT period. In this regard, recent work has highlighted the advantages of
exible over xed exchange rates in EMEs with Koreas characteristics (see
e.g. Céspedes, Chang and Velasco, 2004, Chung, Jung and Yang, 2007, and
Elekdag and Tchakarov, 2007). While Korea has intervened heavily in the
foreign exchange market, this has not precluded the value of the won from
uctuating over time, with no signs of heightened variability in ination, the
output gap and the policy interest rate. Therefore, there is no clear evidence
that such interventions have interfered with BOKs pursuit of its strategy.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, many countries around the globe have adopted ination tar-
geting (IT) regimes with an explicit goal. This has been the case in advanced
economies for over a decade, as in the experiences of Australia, Canada, Great
Britain, Israel, New Zealand and Sweden. Other developed countries that later
joined the group of ination targeters are Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.
In all these cases, the new regime was adopted in the context of exible ex-
change regimes already in place.1 In turn, a large number of emerging market
economies (EME) have recently introduced changes in their monetary and ex-
change rate policies, moving to IT frameworks which operate under o¢ cially
exible exchange rate regimes. South Korea (henceforth Korea) adopted IT
in 1998, completing its transition to a full-edged regime by 2001. A shift to-
wards IT also took place in three other middle-income Asian countries, namely,
Indonesia in 2000, Thailand in 2000, and the Philippines in 2002. In Latin
America, IT has been adopted by Chile in 1990 (together with an exchange
rate oat only since 1999), Colombia and Brazil in 1999, Mexico in 2001 and
Peru in 2002. Among Eastern and Central European countries, EUs largest
new member states Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary have also moved
to comparable monetary and exchange rate policy frameworks (in 1998, 1999
and 2001, respectively), while South Africa counts as another middle-income
ination targeter.2
Considerable research has been devoted to uncovering central bank prefer-
ences. The empirical literature on optimal monetary policy has largely focused
on the US, which is not an IT country. We extend this literature by examin-
1Our denition of an "advanced economy" follows IMFs o¢ cial classication.
2See e.g. Amato and Gerlach (2002), Carare and Stone (2006) and Fraga, Goldfajn and
Minelli (2003). Concerning IT in Asian countries, see Sánchez (2006).
The years of IT adoption for countries cited in the text are taken from IMF (2005), except
for the fact that this study does not include Indonesia and Thailand among the ination
targeters. IMF (2005) denes IT on the basis of the latter regimes use of price stability as a
primary objective, coupled with the role of an ination forecast as the de facto intermediate
policy target. O¢ cial adoption dates may however di¤er from those reported here.
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ing the case of Korea, which is not only an IT country but also a very open
economy and an EME. Our paper uses economic outcomes and an empirical
macro-model to estimate the Bank of Koreas (BOK) loss function in the IT
period. The objective function parameters indicate how di¤erent goals are
traded o¤ in response to shocks. They are estimated under the assumption
that the BOK sets monetary policy optimally, while trying to reach its pre-
announced ination target. It has become customary to use empirical policy
rules to summarise short-term interest rate movements, at least since Taylor
(1993) showed that a simple three-parameter decision rule provided a good
description of the US Federal Reserves (Fed) behaviour. In the case of Korea,
the literature includes both estimates of standard Taylor rules (see e.g. Lee,
2004, and Kim and Park, 2006) and those extended to incorporate the role
of the exchange rate (see e.g. Eichengreen, 2004, and Oh, 2005). Estimated
policy rules are appealing because they capture the systematic relationship
between interest rates and macroeconomic variables and, as such, they can be
viewed as approximations to central bank decision rules. The main drawback
of estimated policy rules is that they are unable to address questions about the
policy formulation process, as they fail to uncover central bank preferences.
The identication of optimal policy weights o¤ers the advantage of unveiling
the monetary authoritys objectives.
From a technical point of view, Ozlale (2003) comes closest to the present
study. This author uses a maximum-likelihood approach to estimate policy
weights conditional on private sector behaviour. He sets up a closed-economy
macro-model for US ination and output (drawing on Rudebusch and Svens-
son, 1999) along with a innite horizon quadratic loss function to summarise
policy objectives. This study reports that the Fed appears to be more con-
cerned about price stability than output stability, with interest rate smoothing
being a key characteristic of the monetary policymaking process. A di¤erent
approach, consisting in the joint estimation of the macro-model and central
8
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bank preferences, is undertaken in Dennis (2006). Otherwise, the latter study,
like Ozlale (2003), employs the Rudebusch-Svensson model to describe the
macroeconomy and uses an innite horizon quadratic objective function. One
caveat to the analysis pursued in the present paper, which is shared with the
afore-mentioned literature, refers to the backward-looking nature of the empir-
ical macro-model, whose simplicity limits its interpretability from a structural
standpoint. Our use of a seemingly unrelated regression approach to estima-
tion of the macro-model - a technique allowing simultaneous equation errors
to be correlated - is adopted in acknowledgement of the reduced-form features
involved.
We deviate from the studies mentioned in the previous paragraph by in-
corporating small-open-economy features. Regarding the macro-model, these
features refer to the inclusion of the exchange rate and its implications for do-
mestic macroeconomic developments (in line with Collins and Siklos, 2004), as
well as the use of external variables that impact the Korean economy. Among
the latter variables are economic activity and interest rates in major advanced
economies, as well as world commodity prices. Additionally, we allow the
BOK to have a concern for exchange rate stability, in light of Koreas status
as a small-open-economy EME. Our estimation framework is also di¤erent
from that advanced by Favero and Rovelli (2003). In their study of the Feds
behaviour, these authors employ a generalised method of moments (GMM) ap-
proach to estimate the equations describing macroeconomic dynamics jointly
with the Euler equation for optimal policymaking. From a technical perspec-
tive, this contrasts with our use of maximum likelihood methods. Moreover,
their assumption of a nite horizon for policymaking (a four-quarter window,
discounted with  = 0.975) stands in contrast with our use of an innite
horizon (discounted with  =0.99 on a quarterly equivalent basis).3
3 In their study for 32 industrialised and developing countries, Ceccheti and Ehrmann
(2002) pursue yet another method to characterise monetary policy intentions. More con-
cretely, they employ a vector autoregressive setup to model macroeconomic dynamics, while
using an output-ination variability frontier to disentangle central bank preferences.
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Another feature of the present paper is that we study the implications of
two types of loss functions. First, we consider rule-of-thumb benchmarks such
as strict IT (or "ination nutter", as labelled in King, 1997) and "exible" IT
(incorporating a role for output stability), supplemented with loss functions
attaching roles to one- and two-period interest rate smoothing, as well as the
exchange rate.4 Second, we turn our attention to optimisation-based objective
functions. This includes both the analysis of optimal objective function para-
meters for the BOK and the assessment of each relevant goals contribution
to the determination of observed interest rate paths. The latter is achieved by
switching o¤ one given optimal weight estimate at a time and then observing
the e¤ect on the implied interest rate path.5
The present paper also di¤ers from the related literature in the treatment
of the ination target. We use the values for such target that are actually pre-
announced by the BOK. This marks a deviation from existing analyses of the
Fed (who does not have an explicit ination target): Dennis (2006) postulates
a xed ination target which is yet another parameter to be estimated; Ozlale
(2003) takes annual average ination as the ination variable the Fed wants
to stabilise; and Collins and Siklos (2004) treat ination targets as Hodrick-
Prescott ination trends.
We examine in the Korean context one issue that is particularly relevant
for EMEs, namely, whether monetary policy is geared towards stabilising the
exchange rate. While exchange rate variability has in recent years risen among
this group of countries, the extent of such uctuations is still a matter of de-
bate. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) nd that these specicities of EMEs are
responsible for a relatively small degree of exchange-rate exibility in these
economies - what the authors label "fear of oating".6 One reason for this
4The former two scenarios have also been investigated by Collins and Siklos (2004).
5Our use of a two-step method (rst estimating the macro-model, then, conditional upon
the latter, obtaining the policy coe¢ cients) allows us to consistently compare the optimal
central banks loss function with rule-of-thumb benchmarks for the policy weights, condi-
tional on the same empirical macro-model.
6This means that, despite the recently proclaimed switch to oating exchange rates,
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is that a weaker currency could lead to adverse balance sheet e¤ects by rais-
ing the domestic-currency real value of external liabilities, thereby causing
economic activity to fall (the so called "contractionary devaluations"). The
empirical literature has generally found that devaluations/depreciations are
contractionary, even after including a number of di¤erent controls (see Ahmed,
2003, who also reviews the previous empirical literature).7 The evidence on
limited exchange rate exibility raises the question whether the desire to sta-
bilise the exchange rate (for nancial stability or other considerations) has
created a conict with other monetary policy goals. Alternatively, one could
expect the improvement on balance sheet of banks in the post-Asian-crisis
years to imply that nancial stability considerations were less of an issue for
Korea. In the latter case, the evolution of the exchange rate may not rep-
resent a direct concern for monetary policy, even if it still matters indirectly
via its impact on other potential policy goals such as ination and economic
activity. In connection with this, Eichengreen (2004) nds that, when setting
the call rate the BOK responds to not just expected ination and the output
gap but also to movements in the won/dollar exchange rate. Since we are able
to identify central bank preferences, we will assess whether Koreas IT regime
evinces a concern for exchange rate stability.
Our analysis of Korean IT begins in 1999, which is the rst full year of
the regimes implementation. Among the class of EME countries, the choice of
Korea appears to be appropriate. Even if Chile implemented an IT scheme in
the early 1990s, the country only adopted such regime in a context of enhanced
exchange rate exibility only in 1999. We decide to employ a monthly sample
the evidence seems to suggest a reversion to some degree of exchange rate management,
albeit one which seems to be less tight than before the crisis. In this regard, some analysts
have found considerable discrepancies between the de jure exchange rate classications and
de facto regimes (see e.g. Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2004, and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger,
2005).
7For the related literature on liability dollarisation, see Céspedes, Chang and Velasco
(2004), and Cook (2004). Those discussing the implications of contractionary depreciations
for monetary policy include Eichengreen (2005), and Sánchez (2007b, 2008).
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to allow enough data for the estimation. Going further back in time would
imply mixing data from the new regime with that of the previous monetary
targeting period, while also involving a likely structural break at the time of
Asian crisis of 1997-1998.8 We use smoothed versions (more concretely, rolling
quarterly moving averages) of our candidate objectives of monetary policy
such as ination, output and the exchange rate. In addition, we explore the
robustness of interest rate smoothing by considering both one- and two-period
smoothing.
Our characterisation of BOK intentions does not directly address the im-
portant question whether Koreas IT regime had an e¤ect on the countrys
macroeconomic performance. For countries that target ination explicitly, the
international evidence on this issue is mixed. Analysts often conclude that
countries that adopt IT manage to reduce ination to low levels and curb in-
ation and interest rate volatility (see e.g. Corbo, Landerretche and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2001, and Neumann and von Hagen, 2002). By way of contrast, Ball
and Sheridan (2005) question whether this is the case among advanced coun-
tries. In their study of 20 OECD countries (7 of which are ination targeters),
they show that, after controlling for the e¤ect of the regression to the mean,
IT countries fail to exhibit a better performance than non-ination targeters
in terms of ination, output and interest rates.9 The lack of a consensus is
also apparent concerning other important e¤ects of IT regimes, such as policy
credibility, the predictability of ination, and the sacrice ratio (that is, the
output cost of lowering ination).10 In the case of EMEs, the literature is not
as comprehensive and detailed as in the case of developed countries. The evi-
dence appears to be somewhat more supportive of the experience of IT among
EMEs (see e.g. IMF, 2005, and Gonçalves and Salles, 2008). Levin, Natalucci
8Evidence of a structural break in the transmission channels at the time of the crisis (and
switch to IT) is reported in Kim and Chang (2003).
9Pétursson (2004) is similarly sceptical about the post-IT improvement in the macroeco-
nomic performance of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK.
10See Angeriz and Arestis (2007a) for a recent survey.
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and Piger (2004) however show that adopting an explicit ination objective
helps anchor long-run ination expectations and reduce ination persistence
in industrial economies, but not so among EMEs.11 Finally, it is worth men-
tioning the debate about whether the Fed should adopt IT. Favourable views
include Bernanke (2003) and Mishkin (1999). Others (Faust and Henderson,
2004, Friedman, 2003, and Kohn, 2005) argue that the Fed should avoid IT as
the latter could limit the exibility of the central bank to respond to promote
other goals such as real and nancial stability.
The main results of this paper are as follows. During the IT regime, the
data support that the BOK pursued optimal policy geared towards achieving
price stability, with the degree of interest rate smoothing being estimated to
play a considerable role in the monetary policy objective function. In addition,
the central bank loss function appears to include a negligible weight on output
variability. This type of results are also found in related studies for advanced
economies, including ination targeters and the US. Our estimate of a much
bigger weight on ination than output in the loss function is broadly in line
with the Korean monetary authoritys mandate. Moreover, by looking at the
estimated policy objective function the weight on exchange rate is found to be
negligible. The latter however does not prevent the Korean central bank from
responding to uctuations in the value of the won in light of their possible
impact on ination developments. Communicating the role of the wons value
in relation to targeted objectives could only contribute to enhancing monetary
policy credibility. The absence of a direct concern for exchange rate variability
is consistent with the wons higher exibility observed in the IT era.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the
institutional arrangements for IT in Korea. Section 3 outlines the papers the-
11Further to full-edged IT countries, some EMEs have implemented similar schemes while
failing to adopt all the corresponding features. In particular, they have been characterised
as not being able to maintain ination as the main policy goal and enjoying low credibility,
in light of external vulnerabilities, a weak institutional framework and nancial instability
(see Angeriz and Arestis, 2007b).
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oretical approach and empirical methodology. Results and policy implications
are discussed in section 4. Section 5 o¤ers concluding remarks.
2 Ination targeting in Korea
The primary objective of the BOK is to pursue price stability, as stated in
the revised Bank of Korea Act that came into e¤ect in April 1998. The BOK
has also referred to economic and nancial stability as secondary objectives.
In particular, the latters absence is deemed to have the potential to trigger
serious economic crises, as well as impeding the normal operation of monetary
policys transmission mechanism (BOK, 2003).
The central bank decides the ination target in consultation with the gov-
ernment. The target was set for an annual period until 2003. In this year, a
shift to a medium-term policy focus was introduced.12 Since then, ination
targets have been set for two medium-term periods, namely, 2004-2006 and
the current one, 2007-2009. Initially, BOKs ination target was framed in
terms of headline CPI ination.13 The target changed to core CPI ination
in 2000. Moreover, starting from the medium-term period 2007-2009 the in-
ation target no longer corresponds to the core CPI measure but to headline
CPI (BOK, 2006). Given that our sample ends in 2006, it seems reasonable
to refer here to core CPI ination as the relevant target variable. Concerning
operational aspects about the ination target, the BOK chooses a range as
opposed to a point target. If needed, this provides a great deal of exibility,
for instance with regard to output stabilisation or nancial stability consider-
ations. The band around the central target was of 1% until 2002, thereafter
12To be more precise, in 2000, alongside the annual ination target the BOK started
announcing a medium-run ination target to account for the lag in monetary policy. The
medium-run target was 2.5% for 2002 and 2.5-3.5% for 2003. From the 2004-2006 period
onwards, the distinction between annual and medium-run ination targets disappear.
13Although the BOK added in 1999 a provisory clause stipulating that the benchmark
indicator should exclude the e¤ect of shocks arising from natural disasters or tax reform, the
conditional clause was not used in practice (even if the economic situation warranted it).
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being somewhat narrower at 0:5%. In particular, for both 2004-2006 and
2007-2009, the target was set at 2:5 0:5%.
The decision maker is the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), who uses
the call money market rate as the monetary policy operational target in or-
der to achieve its objectives. In particular, the call rate is raised if ination
is expected to be above target over the relevant time horizon. The MPC
uses an ination forecast but also relevant indicators to gauge the existence
of inationary pressures and other key ingredients to its strategy.14 Forecast-
ing models to assess future ination developments have been in place since
the launch of IT in Korea (Oh, 2000). Regarding communicational aspects,
the BOK announces its monetary policy decisions immediately, transmits its
general intentions to the public, and submits an annual report on monetary
policy to the National Assembly. The announcement of explicit quantitative
o¢ cial targets should contribute to enhancing communication with the public,
also providing discipline, accountability and transparency in monetary policy.
Monetary policy decisions are communicated in a press conference, providing
detailed background to them. Discussions among MPC members have started
to be released with a six-week lag. At least once a year, the BOK submits
a Monetary Policy Report to the National Assembly, specifying whether the
ination target has been achieved, the reasons for success or failure, the mon-
etary policy actions taken and the future policy direction. BOKs Governor
is required to answer the questions of National Assembly members regarding
the report. On a di¤erent matter, it is worth mentioning that the BOK has
over time moved in the direction of using more market-friendly methods of
monetary management concerning open market operations.
Given that Koreas shift IT took place in the aftermath of the Asian crisis
of 1997-1998, the launch of the regime was preceded and initially surrounded
by signicant macroeconomic and nancial instability. In 1998, the BOK was
14Such indicators include sectoral economic activity, prices of goods and services, real
estate prices, the output gap and the NAIRU (Kim and Park, 2006).
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confronted with deteriorating tradeo¤s between di¤erent potential goals, most
prominently between then high ination and the ongoing recession. Moreover,
the authorities faced the problem that a weak won that could endanger nan-
cial stability via its e¤ects on dollarised balance sheets. For instance, Korean
real GDP declined during 1997Q4 1998Q1, while the call rate went up from
16.4% to 23.9% during the same period. Such interest rate hikes attempted
to mitigate the wons depreciation and address the concern of rising ina-
tion, thereby sacricing the goal of alleviating the ongoing recession (Hsing
and Lee, 2004). The success in containing exchange rate depreciation was far
from complete as neither interest rate hikes nor foreign exchange interventions
prevented the won from depreciating (see e.g. Kim, 2000, and Han, 2003).15
The di¢ culties facing Koreas IT did not completely disappear in the
period 1999-2000, which can be best seen as a transition phase. For some time
after ITs launch, the BOK continued to set targets for M3, thus continuing
with its previous monetary targeting experience.16 The period 1999-2000 can
be seen as a transition phase, in which the BOK decided to maintain some
features of the previous monetary targeting regime as the new IT scheme was
put in place.17 It is however worth indicating that, as of 1999, Korea did no
longer need to consult the adequate level of M3 with the IMF in the context
of the then ongoing economic programme with the latter institution.
With regard to consumer price developments, the post-crisis period (in-
cluding IT transition years 1999 and 2000) was marked by large swings in
both headline and core ination measures. This can be gauged by looking at
15Sánchez (2008a) argues that this is in part related to the fact that the Asian crisis was not
simply a nancial but also became a real disturbance inducing a contraction of intra-regional
trade.
16On the latter regime, see e.g. Dueker and Kim (1999) and Choi (2003).
17The period in question witnessed other adverse circumstances, such as nancial turmoil
associated with di¢ culties facing the Daewoo and Hyundai business groups. These bad news
from the early phase of Korean IT should however not be overemphasised, given that the
following years were also subjected to unfavourable shocks, including Hynix groups nancial
problems and the 9/11 terror attacks (in 2001), the Iraqi war and geopolitical risks related
to North Korea (in 2002), and the credit card boom and bust (in 2003).
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Figure 1, which shows key consumer ination series since 1999 alongside the
ination target bands from 1999.18 Following this relatively volatile initial
phase, the IT regime can be characterised by a relative stabilisation in ina-
tion developments. More precisely, the monetary policy implemented in Korea
over these years appears to been able to maintain ination at reasonably low
and stable rates of around 2 to 3% per annum.
Ination has displayed some variability even after the initial transition
years, including an undershooting of the core ination target in 2005-2006.
However, uctuations appear to have been much more moderate in the period
preceding the launch of the IT regime. This is further examined in Table 1,
which reports summary statistics for the key domestic and external variables
used in the present study. We focus on the description of the changes observed
in the volatility of the main domestic and external variables, as measured by
their standard deviations within each period.19 Two periods are examined,
namely, 1991H1-1997H1 and 2000H1-2006H1. This means that we exclude
the crisis period extending from mid-1997 to 1999, the rst full year of Korean
IT regimes implementation. The reason why we start in 1991 is that this is
the rst year for which data on call rates are available.
Table 1 shows that there was a drop in the volatility of call interest rates
between the two periods. As we have said, this variable became the instrument
of monetary policy only in the IT period. A more predictable behaviour in
call interest rates has been accompanied by a marked reduction in ination
volatility (for both the core and headline denitions) and a mild rise in output
volatility (for both industrial production and overall GDP). Notwithstanding,
18All these series correspond to the core ination concept. Before 1999, core ination
is dened as the rate of change in the series for non-food non-energy CPI, obtained from
OECDs Main Economic Indicators. See section 4 for a description of the remaining data
series used in Figure 1.
We do not show in Figure 1 the rst ination target, which was announced for 1998 (91%
for the year).
19The external variables included here are a subset of all those considered in our analysis
(for the full list, see section 4). More precisely, those considered in Table 1 are the ones
found to enter our macro-model signicantly (see Appendix B for details).
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when looking at the corresponding output gap measures, there appears to have
been a moderate reduction in their volatility. This suggests that uctuations
in real economic activity have been driven to a larger extent by developments
in potential output in the IT era. Moreover, looking at the di¤erent statistics
for domestic economic activity reported in Table 1, industrial production (be
it in its raw form or in deviation from trend) appears to be a relatively good
indicator of overall GDP cyclical developments. It is however worth noting
that mean growth has been somewhat higher for actual GDP, largely owing
to the relatively fast expansion of the services sector.
Concerning the persistence of domestic variables, there is evidence of an
extremely high autoregressive component for call interest rates. For the IT
period, this is indicative of a pronounced interest rate smoothing motive. The
persistence of ination remained relatively high during the IT period, while
that of output measures (be it actual output or the output gap) has declined
considerably. Continued high ination persistence raises the question whether
the Korean ITs regime has enjoyed low degree of credibility, with the BOK
not appearing to have contributed to weaken the ination propagation mecha-
nisms. Whatever the explanation behind high ination persistence, it is worth
recalling that the Korean IT era has been characterised by lower volatility in
ination and the output gap.
Exchange rate uctuations appear to have become somewhat more volatile
in the IT era, judging from the summary measure given by the nominal ef-
fective exchange rate (NEER). The enhanced exibility of the won against
the US dollar has largely contributed to that outcome, despite the well-known
fact that foreign exchange intervention in this market has been considerable
in recent years. Higher won/USD variability has been accompanied by more
muted movements in the won vis-à-vis the yen, while still being consistent with
the above-mentioned result of larger overall nominal exchange rate exibility.
Concerning the real e¤ective exchange rate (REER), it has exhibited lower
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variability in the IT period. Given enhanced nominal exchange rate exibility,
the latter result cannot be attributed to foreign exchange intervention, but
more likely to dampened uctuations in prices - in line with the evolution of
Korean CPI data developments referred to in the previous paragraph.
Finally, we present some evidence that the decline in variability in key
macroeconomic variables in the IT period was overall helped by the lower
variability observed in some of the external variables used in our macro-model.
This is not the case of G7 variables (industrial production and short-term
interest rates), whose volatility has remained relatively stable between the two
periods. Instead, there has been some reduction in the volatility of oil and
non-oil commodity prices, which has helped make terms of trade somewhat
more stable as well.
In sum, there is evidence of reduced variability in ination and output gaps
in the IT period compared to the 1990s in the pre-Asian-crisis era. These are
very important favourable developments, which occurred even if other partial
features of the data could be interpreted in a less positive light (such as the
mild increase in actual output volatility or the continued high degree of ina-
tion persistence in the more recent period). On balance, thus, the evidence
presented here could be interpreted as an improved macroeconomic perfor-
mance in Korea during the IT period. Moreover, we observe lower volatility
in call interest rates - the policy instrument under the IT scheme - alongside
more predictable developments in external variables such as world commodity
prices and Koreas terms of trade. This raises the important question as to
whether the improvement in Korean macroeconomic performance during the
2000s has been driven by policy or external factors beyond the authoritiescon-
trol. It is worth clarifying that the present paper does not provide an answer
to this question, which would require further research aimed at identifying the
forces behind macroeconomic uctuations. We instead focus on a di¤erent
aspect of Korean IT: the characterisation of BOKs objective function in the
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period since 1999. This will allow us to address the main issues concerning IT,
namely, the role of ination and output stability in central bank preferences,
as well as the degree of interest rate smoothing. In addition, we will examine
whether, in the period following Koreas move to formal IT, exchange rate
uctuations have been a direct concern for monetary policy.
3 The model specication
Our setup follows that of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). The monetary
authority sets its instrument so as to minimise the following loss function:20
Et
1X
s=t
s t
h
!
 
Qs
2
+ !y
 
yQs
2
+ !di(is   is 1)2 + !d2i(is   is 2)2 + !e
 
eQs
2i
(1)
where  2 (0; 1) is a subjective discount factor, Qt is the ination rate t
(in deviation from its pre-announced target),21 yQt the three-month moving
average of the output gap yt, it the call rate (in deviation from a time-varying
trend), and eQt the three-month moving average of REER, et, also measured in
deviation from a time-varying trend.22 The (non-negative) weights the central
bank places on these various goals are given by !, !y , !di, !d2i and !e. The
rst three weights are rather standard, reecting a desire for price stability,
output stability and interest rate smoothing, respectively. Smoothing refers
to the notion that central banks tend to adjust their policy interest rates in
sequences of relatively small steps over several years with only rare reversals of
direction. The use of moving averages for the policy goals is motivated by our
20Modern research in macroeconomics shows that quadratic loss functions such as (1)
here can be, under certain conditions, interpreted as a second order approximation to the
welfare of the representative agent (see e.g. Woodford, 2003b). Here we make the standard
simplifying assumption that the marginal rate of substitution between goals is independent
of the economic structure. This assumption is however relaxed in the context of optimising
frameworks (see Walsh, 2005).
21Moreover, the ination objective will be measured here in annual terms, while using
data that is available on a monthly basis.
22More specically, in the case of three-month moving averages a given such average is
dened as zQt  (1=3)
P2
k=0 ztt k, where z = y; e.
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use of high frequency (monthly) data. This is also the rationale behind the
inclusion of weight !d2i, whose economic interpretation is that of capturing
acceleration or deceleration concerns regarding the path of interest rates. It
can also be interpreted as a smoothing interest rate motive but extended over
an extra period of time. Weight !e captures the notion that the central bank
may want to stabilise the value of the exchange rate.23
The rest of the economy is represented by an estimated macro-model. The
latter is similar to that of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), extended to in-
clude small-open-economy features. These include: a) modelling the exchange
rate and its implications for ination and output uctuations (in line with
Collins and Siklos, 2004); and b) controlling for external variables that in-
uence Koreas macroeconomic developments. The latter variables include
economic activity and interest rates in major advanced economies alongside
commodity price developments. More precisely, our macro-model consists of
the following equations:
yt = (L)yt 1 + (L) (it 1   t 1) + (L)et 1 + (L)xt 1 + "yi (2)
t = (L)t 1 + (L)yt 1 + (L)et 1 + (L)xt 1 + "i (3)
et = (L)et 1 + (L) (it 1   t 1) + (L)yt 1 +  (L)xt 1 + "ei (4)
where (L), (L), etc., are polynomials in the lag operator L. Equation (2)
states that aggregate demand reacts to its own lags, the interest rate, the
exchange rate and exogenous variables xt (such as commodity prices, and
foreign output, interest rates and ination). Equation (3) is the Phillips curve,
with ination determined by its lags, the output gap, the exchange rate, and
exogenous variables. Equation (4) is an exchange rate equation, where this
variable (in real e¤ective terms) depends on its recent past, as well as on
interest rates and output both at home and abroad (alongside other exogenous
23This consistent with BOKs objective of maintaining nancial stability insofar as a sub-
stantial depreciation of the won would cause adverse balance sheet e¤ects.
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variables). In line with the previously cited related literature, the model we
set up is, for tractability, backward-looking.
The macro-model is estimated using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
methodology, which allows the error terms to be correlated across equations
(see Appendix B for details). We employ monthly data ranging from 1999:1
to 2006:12. Data on real output, measured as an industrial production index,
are from the IMFs International Financial Statistics (henceforth IFS). The
series for the call rate as well as the actual and targeted core CPI ination
data are obtained from the BOK. REER ("broad" measure for 52 countries)
is taken from BIS.24 In Table 1, we have used "narrow" NEER and REER
measures (for 26 and 27 countries, respectively; from BIS) which are available
over a longer time span. Concerning xt, we consider the following set of global
variables - not all of them being found to be statistically signicant, and thus
used, in the models nal specication. World economic activity is measured
in terms of either US or G7 countriesindustrial production indicators (from
IFS) - the latter weighted according to an average over the entire sample of
their quarterly national accounts (from the OECD database) expressed in US
dollars. The same weights are used to: a) construct a G7 CPI index from in-
dividual countriesrespective indices (data from IFS); and b) build a measure
of G7 interest rate levels from short-term interest rates (from IFS). Alterna-
tively, US series for CPI ination and short-term rates (from IFS) were used.
Koreas terms of trade are computed from IFS data. Brent oil prices in US
dollars are from IFS. Non-oil commodity prices in US dollars are from the
Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA), and are computed
using OECD countriesweights. Finally, global equity prices are measured in
24While the use of REER keeps our analysis close to related theoretical models, some
authors have emphasised the relevance of the yen/dollar rate for Korean macroeconomic
dynamics. For instance, McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) investigate the role of the yen/dollar
rate in East Asian economies, providing evidence that a major yen devaluation has a negative
impact on their real economic activity. Kang, Kim and Wang (2005) qualify this conclusion
by showing that the e¤ects of the weakening of the yen against the US dollar exchange rate
on the Korean economy are statistically signicant only since the Asian crisis.
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terms of the MSCI index (from Morgan Stanley Capital International). Trend
values for the di¤erent variables other than ination are estimated by means
of the Hodrick-Prescott lter.
The central banks problem is to minimise (1) subject to (2), (3), and (4).
The solution yields the central banks optimal reaction function. Because the
loss function is quadratic, the optimal reaction function is linear in the forcing
variables:
it = rt + t + 'i(L)it 1 + 'y(L)y
Q
t + '(L)
Q
t + 'e(L)et + 'x(L)xt (5)
where rt is the time-varying trend real interest rate, and 'i(L), 'y(L); etc., are
polynomials in the lag operator. Given the parameter estimates for equations
(2), (3), and (4), and values for  and the weights !, !y, !di, !d2i and !e,
one can use numerical methods to obtain the parameters in 'i(L), 'y(L), etc.
The parameter  is set to 0.997, which amounts to a standard 0.99 in quarterly
terms.
We follow Ozlale (2003) in using a maximum-likelihood approach to es-
timate policy parameters conditional on private sector behaviour. For that
purpose, we assume that monetary policy is determined as the solution to a
constrained optimisation problem, with BOKs policy objective function be-
longing to the quadratic class. The solution to this problem determines the
decision rule, or optimal policy rule, that the central bank uses to set the call
rate. On the basis that Korean monetary policy is set optimally, we estimate
the parameters in the policy regime parameters, which are also conditional on
the macro-model elasticities. The estimation process thus involves backing out
from the way macroeconomic variables evolve over time, and relative to each
other, the objective function parameters that best describe the data. This ap-
proach avoids the need to estimate an unconstrained reduced form policy rule.
(For a description of how the optimal feedback rule is obtained, see Appendix
A.)
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As mentioned earlier, in order to best characterise BOK intentions we con-
sider two types of loss functions. Let us describe each type in turn. We rst
look at rule-of-thumb benchmarks, then turning our attention to optimisation-
based objective functions. In the case of benchmark objective functions (see
panel A in Table 2), we normalise the weights by setting ! = 1. Thus, in
all benchmarks analysed here the weights for the four remaining goals should
be interpreted as relative to !. The rst set of policy weights considered (in
line 1) is that of a strict ination targeter, namely a central bank that fo-
cuses exclusively on ination. Following King (1997), this type of policymaker
can be labelled an "ination nutter". Line 2 shows the second set, which we
call exible IT. This case assumes that central bank cares about both in-
ation and output, while also smoothing interest rates slightly. Rudebusch
and Svensson (1999) argue that these assumptions t the US data well for the
years 1961 to 1996.25 The third set of weights (Benchmark 3) allows for a
considerable degree of smoothing (!di = 5), while also permitting output to
be a concern for the BOK (wy = 1). The fourth and fth sixth sets, labelled
Benchmarks 4 and 5, respectively, involve the other two weights used here,
namely, !e and !d2i: Neither set of weights assumes any concern for output
stability. The fourth set mixes heavy smoothing and a concern for exchange
rates (we = 1), while the fth set combines high degree of smoothing over
both one- and two-month periods (!d2i = 5).
We now turn to the second type of central bank preferences, namely, those
based on optimisation considerations (see panel B in Table 2). This includes
both the set of optimal policy weights and those resulting from switching o¤
one given optimal weight estimate at a time to assess its relative contribution
to the observed interest rate path. Given that ! is one of the weights set to
zero in one specic scenario, this time we decide not to normalise the weights
by setting ! = 1, but instead by making all included weights add up to
25 In their characterisations of optimal policy, Collins and Siklos (2004) also consider our
rst two benchmarks.
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one at the optimum.26 Moreover, we do not consider the joint possibility of
one- and two-period smoothing; we instead set !d2i = 0 from the outset.
27
As will be made clear in the next section, !y and !e are both estimated to
be small and positive, but not di¤erent from zero statistically. We thus set
!y = !e = 0 in all optimisation-based scenarios:We are thus left with only !
and !di as non-zero weights to be switched o¤ alternatively. Switching o¤ !di
amounts to benchmark 1 above (strict IT). Therefore, the only new scenario
to consider is that where the BOK focuses exclusively on (one-period) interest
rate smoothing, which obtains by setting ! = 0. It is worth saying that we
do not rescale the non-zero !di weight to add up to one as this would make
no di¤erence for the implied interest rate path. Table 2 (panel B) reports our
two new sets of optimisation-based policy weights: optimal weights in line 6,28
followed by those obtained by switching ! o¤ in line 7.
4 Empirical results
Our estimation methodology backs up BOKs objective function parameters
conditional on private sector behaviour, assuming that policy is set optimally.
As explained in section 3, in addition to optimisation-based objective func-
tions we consider rule-of-thumb benchmarks. In all cases, we present the
results from our approach in terms of a comparison between actual policy in-
terest rates and paths obtained by simulating the optimal reaction functions.
Along the way, we report correlation coe¢ cients between simulated interest
26Which specic type of normalisation we adopt is inconsequential. The only thing that
matters for representing central bank preferences are the relative weights between all possible
objectives. The two types of normalisation used here simply full the aim of helping clarify
the meaning behind the loss function in question.
27The reason for this is that, as we shall see later, a positive value for !d2i does not appear
to improve much the t of policy rules to actual call rates.
28As can be seen in Appendix B, our optimal weights are consistent with the notion that
the BOK followed the "Taylor principle". According to the latter, central banks can stabilise
the macroeconomy by raising their interest rate instrument more than one-for-one in response
to higher ination in the long run.
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rate paths and actual call rates (see Table 3).29 The set of all di¤erent com-
binations of weights employed here is reported in Table 2.
We start by comparing actual (nominal) call rates (dark blue lines in all
Figures 2 through 5) with the scenarios given by all of our rule-of-thumb
benchmarks under study. Figure 2 contrasts the levels of call interest rates
that a strict ination targeter would have selected (pink solid line) with the
corresponding actual call rates. Actual call rates di¤er markedly from what
would have occurred had Korea pursued strict IT. Under strict targeting,
policy interest rates would have varied wildly, often hitting double-digits, and
sometimes turning negative (unless we were to impose a zero bound on nominal
interest rates).
Figure 3 presents actual call rates alongside two di¤erent cases: i) Bench-
mark 2, which corresponds to "exible" IT (light blue solid line) in the deni-
tion of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) (wy = 1, !di = 0:5); and ii) Benchmark
3 (purple dashed line), which is a variation of the latter case where the cen-
tral bank displays a considerable degree of (one-period) smoothing (!di = 5).
Consistent with the ndings of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), "exible" IT
lies much closer to actual call interest rates than strict IT (improving the cor-
relation with actual call rates from 0.380 to 0.925; see Table 3). However, this
type of exible targeting still appears to be an inaccurate representation of
IT in Korea. In particular, the simulations indicate that a Benchmark 2-type
ination targeter would have at times deviated considerably from actual be-
haviour, especially over the period 1999-2002. In any case, our nding that
Korea has not focused exclusively on ination since 1999 implies that the BOK
pursues "exible" policies of some type, even if they do not exactly correspond
to Benchmark 2. Benchmark 3, also shown in Figure 3, appears to t observed
call rates better than both strict IT and Benchmark 2 (correlation with actual
29Appendix B briey discusses all implied policy rules, also in comparison with the
"unconstrained" estimated policy rule. The regressors in the latter are the same as the
state variables of the model, as described in section 3 and Appendix A.
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call rates at 0.979; see Table 3). The distinctive feature of Benchmark 3 rel-
ative to Benchmark 2 is that the former involves a higher value for !di (that
is, a higher degree of interest rate smoothing).
Figure 4 compares actual policy interest rates with two paths obtained
from simulations that include both a concern for ination (! = 1) and con-
siderable degree of smoothing (!di = 5). Here, we rule out the possibility that
output stabilisation plays a direct role (wy = 0). Unlike the previous cases, we
consider alternatively the remaining two candidate policy goals. Concretely,
Benchmark 4 (light green solid line) permits exchange rate stability to be a
concern for the BOK (we = 1), while Benchmark 5 (dark green dashed line)
instead allows for a considerable role for smoothing over a two-month period
(!d2i = 5). Benchmark 4 is largely at odds with actual interest rate uctu-
ations, especially between 1999 and 2002. Comparison of Benchmark 5 with
Benchmark 3 in Figure 3 points to the exchange rate not entering the pol-
icy objective function with a higher weight than output would.30 Turning to
two-period smoothing, consideration of this goal is encouraging in that the
corresponding interest rate path ts actual call rates rather well (correlation
with actual call rates at 0.991; see Table 3). However, it does not appear to
add much to what was already explained by a role for output (see Benchmark
3 in Figure 3). For this reason, we do not consider weight !d2i when deriving
our optimal weights for the central bank objective function.
Table 4 reports the weights estimated to be attached by the BOK to its
candidate objectives at the optimum. The weights on output and the exchange
rate are found to small and positive, but statistically insignicant.31 The lack
of output and exchange rate stabilisation goals suggests that, if the latter two
variables were to enter the estimated policy rule for Korea, this would be the
30The correlation between path i4t and actual call rates equals 0.881 (Table 3).
31For the Fed, Favero and Rovelli (2003), Castelnuovo and Surico (2004), Collins and
Siklos (2004) and Dennis (2006) all estimate the weight attached to output stability be close
to zero. In contrast, Ozlale (2003) reports a signicant, non-negligible (full sample) output
coe¢ cient but still smaller than that for ination. Collins and Siklos (2004) report negligible
output weights for Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
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case only because it contains information about future ination. We identify
a concern for price stability, with ! = 0:309, implying a high value for the
weight on interest rate smoothing (!di = 0:691). Our estimate of a much bigger
weight on ination than output in the loss function is broadly in line with the
Koreas IT framework, which has price stability as the central banks primary
objective. The interest rate path consistent with optimal weights (Benchmark
6, grey solid line in Figure 5) matches actual call rates rather closely, with
correlation with actual call rates at 0.984 (Table 3). This is supportive of
the notion that the BOK behaved optimally adjusting the policy interest rate
very gradually in its pursuit of price stability. The important role played by
price stability can be assessed by switching o¤ !, which leaves us with a
pure concern for interest rate smoothing (Benchmark 7, orange dashed line
in Figure 5). The path implied by the latter conguration lies far away from
observed call rates (correlation with actual call rates at 0.697; see Table 3),
providing a positive consistency check for our result that ! is positive and
statistically signicant. Switching o¤ !di amounts to Benchmark 1, which is
the strict IT case already described. Under this scenario, simulated interest
rates are found to move wildly around the path registered by actual call rates.
Concerning the interest rate smoothing motive, we estimate a high value for
!di.
While we nd that the BOK places a negligible emphasis on both output
and the exchange rate, the latter two variables play indirect roles in the deter-
mination of ination, and thus of monetary policy itself. Indeed, inspection of
our estimated macro-model allows us to see that ination is directly a¤ected
by both output and REER (see equation (A.11) in Appendix B). Output also
enters the exchange rate equation (A.12), thereby contributing to also a¤ect in-
ation via the exchange rate pass-through channel.32 All these considerations
32 Instead, the demand for output does not appear to react to the exchange rate (see
equation A.10 in Appendix B). This can be rationalised under the assumption that the
favourable e¤ect of the exchange rate on competitiveness (owing to incomplete pass-through)
is by and large o¤set by adverse balance-sheet e¤ects. Alternatively, the absence of the
28
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1004
February 2009
point to the conclusion that, even if they are not monetary policy objectives,
output and exchange rates indicators are worth being monitored on a regular
basis by the BOK.
Summarising the results from this section thus far, we nd that the Korean
IT regime could be characterised in terms of optimal policy geared towards
achieving price stability, with interest rate smoothing being estimated to be
considerable. In addition, monetary policy is estimated to have placed negligi-
ble weights on output and exchange rate variability in setting monetary policy.
These results deserve further discussion, to which we devote the remainder of
this section.
Analysts very often report that interest rate smoothing is an important
feature of central banks. It is worth saying that, despite the extensive re-
search e¤ort devoted to the subject, the literature has not reached a consen-
sus about the connection between interest rate smoothing and concerns about
output stability. Many of the approaches to smoothing implicitly or explicitly
assume that there is no such connection. This implies that, when policymak-
ers take a decision in pursuit of one goal, they would not see their actions
as contributing by themselves to achieving a di¤erent objective. This view
is normally embedded in standard examinations of interest rate smoothing.
In the literature, monetary policy inertia is sometimes linked to the notion
that large movements in interest rates can lead to lost reputation, or credi-
bility, if a policy intervention subsequently needs to be reversed. Moreover,
parameter uncertainty makes it optimal for policymakers to be cautious when
changing interest rates. More specically, the explanations that have attracted
recent research attention include the presence of forward-looking expectations
(Woodford, 2003a), data uncertainty (Orphanides, 2003), and parameter un-
certainty (Sack, 2000).33 In the absence of a link between the policy weights on
exchange rate as a regressor in the IS curve has sometimes been interpreted as indicating
that a exible exchange rate completely insulates the economy from global shocks.
33Ellison (2006) has advanced another explanation for interest rate inertia. In his model,
policymakers internalise the costs incurred by the public in learning the models uncertain
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interest rate smoothing and output variability, our results for Korea should be
interpreted as reecting a gradualist approach to ination without any further
output stabilisation goal. In this sense, our estimate of a much bigger weight
on ination than output in the loss function is deemed in line with Korean
monetary authoritys mandate, which has price stability as its primary objec-
tive. Even within this interpretation, the pursuit of ination stabilisation is
estimated to be gradual.
A di¤erent reading of our ndings is possible in light of some literature that
explains interest rate smoothing in connection with output variability. Collins
and Siklos (2004) interpret their result that central banks evince strong inter-
est rate smoothing as indirect evidence of concerns for output stability. This
interpretation draws from Svenssons (1999) assertion that IT central banks
adopt a more gradualist (that is, exible) policy under three scenarios: con-
cerns about output stability, model uncertainty and interest rate smoothing.
By dampening uctuations in interest rates the central bank would contribute
to reducing volatility in economic activity via this specic channel.34 In this
light, failure to uncover a weight on output would not preclude the BOK from
having an indirect concern for output stability relating to an interest rate
smoothing motive. Our result that Korea follows a gradualist approach to-
ward ination could thus be seen as compatible with an implicit - as opposed
to an explicit - output stabilisation goal. This interpretation is roughly in line
with Koreas monetary policy framework, as long as it is not meant to imply a
too pressing concern for output stability. Indeed, while price stability is BOKs
primary objective, this institution is also expected to look after economic and
parameters, nding it optimal to reduce the number of interest rate reversals.
34Judging from the set of optimal weights reported here, an output stabilisation goal
appears to be redundant after enabling the BOK to attach weights to the variability in
ination and interest rates. However, it is worth recalling that modelling Koreas gradualist
approach to pursuing price stability in terms of smoothing and output stability objectives
(see Benchmarks 2 and 3 above) helped better characterise the observed call interest rate
path, compared with the strict IT scenario. This was the case even for the Benchmark 2,
which allows for only a moderate degree of interest rate smoothing (!di = 0:5).
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nancial stability - the latter in particular being deemed instrumental to avoid
major crises. In sum, both of the views about smoothing described here are
broadly consistent with BOKs mandate, but they involve somewhat di¤erent
interpretations as to the importance that the BOK attaches to output stability
under the IT scheme.
As mentioned above, one of our important results is that the Korean mon-
etary authority does not appear to put any weight on the exchange rate. This
nding is in line with the notion that the BOK may use the realisations of
the exchange rate as a leading indicator for relevant macroeconomic develop-
ments. The absence of a direct concern for exchange rate variability is also
consistent with the evidence about the wons higher exibility during the IT
period. After all, IT regimes have spread among EMEs partly as a result of
these countriesdisenchantment with exchange rate pegs.35 The experience
with pegs showed that EMEs were vulnerable to speculative attacks, thereby
leading to di¢ cult choices such as a drawdown of international reserves and
costly real adjustments. Recent studies have stated the case for enhanced
exchange rate exibility of the type envisaged in IT schemes. For instance,
Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) show that, for reasonable parameter val-
ues, a oat should dominate a xed exchange rate scheme, even in the presence
of liability dollarisation which makes the exchange rate adjustment more bur-
densome. Using an estimated DSGE for Korea, Chung, Jung and Yang (2007)
report that an IT rule with a oating exchange rate is superior to an exchange
rate peg. Elekdag and Tchakarov (2007) extend existing work by using a
second-order approximation to unveil the relation between uncertainty and
welfare. They nd that, except for cases of relatively high external debt ratios
(in particular above Korean standards), a exible exchange rate regime dom-
inates a peg. The key mechanism involved here is the presence of a nancial
accelerator coupled with liability dollarisation, which appears to be a relevant
35Regarding other arrangements, monetary targeting proved to be unreliable in light of
nancial innovation and other forces behind the instability of money demand.
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feature of the Korean economy according to the estimates reported in Elekdag,
Justiniano and Tchakarov (2006). While Korea has intervened heavily in the
foreign exchange market, this has not precluded the value of the won from
uctuating over time, with no signs of heightened ination and interest rate
variability. Therefore, there is no clear evidence that such interventions have
interfered with BOKs pursuit of price stability.36
5 Concluding remarks
Koreas experience since IT implementation in 1999 has been broadly satisfac-
tory, with ination in particular being relatively low and stable. During the IT
regime, the data support that Korea pursued optimal policy geared towards
achieving price stability - BOKs primary goal. Moreover, by looking at the
estimated objective function the degree of interest rate smoothing appears to
have played a considerable role, while the BOK is found to put a negligible
weight on output variability. The much higher weight put on ination relative
to output is consistent with the pursuit of price stability. In obtaining these
results, we shed light on the general issues concerning IT, such as the weights
attached by the central bank to ination stability versus output stability, as
well as the role of interest rate smoothing. Our result of a strong interest rate
smoothing, coupled with a concern for price stability a negligible weight on
output, is consistent with previous studies for the US and explicit IT advanced
economies.
In line with the existing literature, we have provided two di¤erent explana-
tions for our results. According to one of them, interest rate smoothing is seen
as independent from central bank concerns for output variability. This view
is embedded in standard contributions that focus on characterising smoothing
36Our analysis relates to Koreas actual experience with IT. Were the sterilisation of capital
ows to become a destabilising force in the future, a change of course in monetary policy
would be needed in order to restablish macroeconomic stability. An assessment of this
pessimistic scenario is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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rather than establishing possible links with an output stabilisation goal. From
this perspective, our results are to be interpreted as capturing a gradualist
approach to ination targeting, coupled with a neglect for output stability.
Our estimate of a much bigger weight on ination than output would thus be
compatible with Koreas IT framework, which has price stability as the main
goal of monetary policy. The lack of an explicit concern for output variability
would not prevent the central bank from considering output indicators in order
to assess future ination developments. Our results could also be rationalised
in a second way, along the lines of Collins and Siklos (2004). Drawing on
Svensson (1999), these authors interpret the result that central banks evince
strong interest rate smoothing as indirectly reecting some concern for output
stability. In this view, the BOK would adopt a exible policy in which mone-
tary policy inertia aims at dampening output volatility. Therefore, our nding
of a negligible weight on output could still be consistent with the existence of
a (secondary) output stabilisation goal. Despite the contrast between the two
explanations given here, the second one could also be reconciled with Koreas
monetary policy setup. As we have seen, price stability is Koreas monetary
policy main goal, but the BOK is also supposed to care for economic and
nancial stability. In conclusion, the two interpretations given here for the
link between interest rate smoothing and output stabilisation are broadly in
line with Korean monetary scheme. It is however worth noting that these two
views convey somewhat di¤erent implications for the role that output stability
plays in BOK policy moves.
Our results also allow for a better understanding of the role of exchange
rate variability in monetary policymaking, in connection with Koreas status as
both a very open economy and an EME country. Judging from our estimates of
the policy objective function, the Korean monetary authority does not appear
to put any noticeable emphasis on the exchange rate. This is consistent with
the notion that the BOK would benet from monitoring the exchange rate
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for IT considerations. In connection with this, estimated reaction functions
may involve an exchange rate term even if the policymaker does not have
a specic concern for exchange rate uctuations. In particular, our nding
does not contradict Eichengreens (2004) result that the value of the won
enters his estimated monetary policy reaction function for Korea. This author
argues that the communication of the countrys monetary policymaking could
be more transparent about the role played by the exchange rate.37 Judging
from our ndings, this variable is a leading indicator of ination that is worth
monitoring. Communication of such role in relation to targeted objectives
could only contribute to enhancing monetary policy credibility. The nding
that, according to our estimated monetary policy objective function, the BOK
does not put emphasis on the exchange rate is also in line with the wons
higher exibility observed during the IT period, which has occurred despite
considerable intervention in the foreign exchange market. In this regard, recent
work has highlighted the advantages of exible over xed exchange rates in
EMEs with Koreas characteristics (see e.g. Céspedes, Chang and Velasco,
2004, Chung, Jung and Yang, 2007, and Elekdag and Tchakarov, 2007).
There are a number of areas where the analysis in this paper could be
usefully extended. First, it would be worth allowing for real-time policymak-
ing. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate whether the results
change in any material way if we restrict policy decisions to be based only
on information available when policy decisions were made. Second, it would
be desirable to allow private agents to be forward-looking. the presence of
forward-looking private agents raises the need to explicitly deal with time-
inconsistency, which would make the estimation more involved. Backing out
central bank preferences, while also tackling the previous two complications
in a dynamic context, is however far from trivial. Third, more specically
37Concretely, Eichengreen (2004) proposes that the Bank of Korea attach more attention
to the exchange rate when sending its Monetary Policy Report to the National Assembly or
its monthly press releases following decisions of the Monetary Policy Committee.
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concerning the Korean case, it would be useful to compare BOK preferences
reported here for the IT period with estimates for the former monetary target-
ing framework. This would in turn require modelling both private behaviour
and central bank intentions prior to the Asian crisis. As a result, one would
be in a position to assess the evolution in the role played by di¤erent goals,
providing further insights into BOKs role in inuencing key macroeconomic
outcomes.
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Appendix A: Solving for Optimal Reaction Func-
tions
This Appendix describes the central banks optimisation problem, which
consists of minimising (1) subject to (2) through (4). We solve for the con-
strained optimal reaction functions in (5) using the methods described in
Söderlind (1999), and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).
The problem has the structure of the optimal linear regulator. Equations
(2) through (4) may be written in state-space form as:
Xt+1 = AXt +Bit + vt+1 (A.1)
where Xt is the state vector, and matrices A and B are to be specied. In
addition, we can dene the (6 1) vector of goal variables (Qt ; yQt ; it   it 1;
it   it 2; eQt ) as:38
Yt = CxXt + Ciit (A.2)
Finally, the period loss function (1) can be written in matrix form as:
Lt = Yt
0KYt (A.3)
where K is a (6 6) diagonal matrix with elements (1, !y , !di, !d2i and !e)
on the main diagonal.
The macro-model is backward looking, and there is therefore no di¤erence
between the discretionary and commitment solutions. With the set-up written
in the form of equations (A.1) through (A.3), the set of optimal feedback
coe¢ cients satises:
f =  (R+ B 0V B) 1(U 0 + B 0V A) (A.4)
38For the denition of Qt ; y
Q
t
; and eQt , see the main text (section 3).
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where the V obeys the matrix Ricatti equation:
V = Q  Uf   f 0U 0 + f 0Rf + (A Bf) 0V (A Bf) (A.5)
where the matrices Q, U , and R are given by:
Q = Cx
0KCx (A.6)
U = Cx
0KCi (A.7)
R = Ci
0KCi (A.8)
The optimal interest rate policy is given by:
ioptt = fXt (A.9)
Appendix B: Model Estimates and the Empirical
Policy Reaction Function
The Korean model used here has an IS equation, a Phillips curve, and an
exchange rate equation (see expressions (A.10) through (A.12) below). This
system of equations plays the role of expressions (2) through (4) in the main
text. Our macro-model is estimated using a SUR approach. This technique
allows for the possibility that the error terms in equations (A.10)-(A.12) below
be correlated. Our sample comprises monthly data ranging from 1999:1 to
2006:12 (see the main text for the data sources). The model estimates are as
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follows:
yt+1 = 0:656 yt   0:025 (it   t) + 0:543 yG7t (A.10)
(7:727) ( 2:780) (2:519)
t+1 = 0:872 t 3 + 0:046 yt 1 + 0:009 oilt + 0:033 hwwat 2
(24:879) (2:428) (2:512) (3:702)
  0:026 et 2 (A.11)
( 2:471)
et+1   et = 0:295 (et   et 1)  0:042
 
iG7t   iG7t 1

+ 0:191
 
yt 1   yG7t 1

(3:069) ( 2:472) (2:664)
+0:125 tott 1 (A.12)
(2:506)
where t-values are in parenthesis, and are robust to heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation. The following external variables are used: yG7t denotes G7
real GDP; iG7t ; G7 short-term interest rate; tott; Koreas terms of trade; oilt;
the oil price; and hwwat; the HWWA non-oil commodity price index. All
included explanatory variables are precisely estimated (at the 5% signicance
level) and have the conventional signs. Lag selection is made on the basis of the
Akaike criterion, allowing for up to a maximum of 6 lags and choosing on the
basis of relevant variables; variables may enter a given equation alternatively
in levels or in rst di¤erences. Variables represent deviations from a Hodrick-
Prescott trend. Interest rates and ination rates are measured in per cent
per annum terms, while the remaining variables are computed as percentage
deviations from trend.
Compared with the general model postulated in equations (2) through
(4), the most important di¤erences are the lack of an exchange rate term in
the IS curve (A.10) and the lack of a domestic interest rate term (be it in
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nominal or real terms) in the exchange rate equation (A.12). While the direct
unresponsiveness of aggregate demand to a real exchange rate depreciation
could in part be rationalised in terms of the latters ambiguous e¤ects,39 it
is worth noting that the exchange rate does exert an indirect inuence on
economic activity via real interest rate movements. With regard to the lack
of a direct dependence of exchange rates on domestic interest rates, it does
not prevent the latter from indirectly a¤ecting the former via its inuence
on output. As we shall see below, our macro-model does not appear to be
misspecied, judging from a comparison between the optimal interest rate
path and the unconstrained policy rule (both being conditional on the same
state variables of the model). Among other features in (A.10)-(A.12), the
moderate degree of Korean exchange rate pass-through implied by the Phillips
curve is consistent with the ndings reported in CaZorzi, Hahn and Sánchez
(2007).40 It is worth saying that this pass-through does not operate via a
short-run dynamic response, but rather as an adjustment to deviations from
a "long-run" relation between domestic and foreign prices as embedded in the
et 2 term in (A.11).
In order to close the model, we estimate autoregressive processes for ex-
ternal variables, which altogether appear to impact each of the expressions
(A.10) through (A.12). We allow for up to 6 lags; however, at most two are
found to be signicantly di¤erent from zero. The values for the autoregressive
coe¢ cients are as follows. The rst-order coe¢ cients for yG7t , tott, hwwat and
oilt are 0.931, 0.761, 0.898 and 0.759, respectively, while the rst- and second-
order coe¢ cients for iG7t are 1.429 and -0.481, respectively. These estimates
point to rather persistent external variables, with oilt and tott being the least
persistent and iG7t the most.
39 In this regard, see the discussion in the Introduction about how an exchange rate de-
preciation may trigger pro-competitiveness and adverse balance sheet e¤ects that point in
di¤erent directions.
40Sánchez (2007a) nds that low pass-through in emerging East Asia can be rationalised
as arising following a risk premium shock.
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Table A.1 reports three types of monetary policy reaction functions, all of
them being conditional on the same state variables of the model. The rst
column shows tted values from the unrestricted policy rule, {^t. The next
ve policy rules, associated with interest rate paths it (with  = 1; : : : ; 5);
correspond to the ve rule-of-thumb benchmark cases described in section 3
and analysed in section 4. Finally, the last two decision rules in Table A.1 are
interest rate paths it (with  = 6; 7), which refer to the optimisation-based
interest rate paths discussed in sections 3 and 4 (see also footnote in Table
A.1 for details). Interest rate paths i6t and i
7
t denote the optimal interest rate
path and that associated with pure interest rate smoothing, respectively.
In Table A.1, the coe¢ cients of the optimal feedback rule show that the
BOK adjusts interest rates in a gradual fashion in response to movements
in ination and output, among other variables. In particular, an important
feature is the lagged dependence of the interest rate, an outcome that reects
the interest rate smoothing motive. According to optimal behaviour, the BOK
would not appear to take the past values of ination considerably into account.
The long-run coe¢ cient on ination lies above 1 (more precisely, 1.05). Values
above 1 on this coe¢ cient indicate that the ination process is stable: When
ination and ination expectations rise, the central bank raises interest rates
by a larger amount so that the real rate of interest increases. The higher real
interest rate helps dampen ination pressures. Moreover, it is worth noting
that the results in Table A.1 point to the di¤erences between the optimal
policy rule for i6t and a conventional estimated policy rule - the latter being
illustrated here by unconditional policy rule {^t. This is understandable, given
that there is no reason why the monetary policy rule consistent with the
optimal objective function coe¢ cients should resemble that obtained by the
direct estimation of an unconstrained decision rule (even when we use the
same controlling variables). One interesting implication is that we can assess
the t of the model by comparing tted values from both approaches. This is
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done in Figure A.1 for the Korean IT case. Both the optimal interest rate path
and that derived from the unconditional policy rule are similar to observed
call rates.41 This suggests that our model is reasonably well specied, at least
as far as the state variables considered here are concerned. In other words,
both our macro-model elasticities and our characterisation of BOKs objective
function appear to be informative about Koreas IT period.
In any case, we do not wish to put forward a detailed interpretation of the
results in Table A.1. There are a number of reasons for this. In the case of the
unconstrained policy rule, the estimates su¤er from endogeneity. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to improve on the estimation by xing this problem.
Moreover, the focus of the present study is the identication of central bank
preferences, with the optimisation-based policy rules not being entirely easy
to interpret. The reason for the latter is that these rules are a¤ected not only
by the macro-models elasticities, but also by the correlation between error
terms in di¤erent equations.
41All three series in question exhibit high correlation with each other (Table 3).
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Table 1. Summary statistics: 1991H1 - 2006H2
Mean SD Max Min AR Mean SD Max Min AR
A. Domestic variables
Call interest rate 13.4 2.1 18.6 10.9 0.97 4.2 0.6 5.2 3.3 0.99
Real output
   Industrial production 3.9 2.0 7.6 -0.2 0.82 3.6 2.7 8.1 -2.6 0.57
   GDP 7.6 2.4 11.8 2.4 0.86 5.2 2.7 11.0 0.1 0.57
Output gap
   Industrial production 0.1 1.6 2.3 -2.4 0.41 0.0 1.4 2.8 -2.4 -0.05
   GDP 0.0 1.1 1.4 -1.4 0.59 0.0 0.7 1.5 -1.1 0.06
CPI inflation
   Headline 5.9 1.8 10.0 4.2 0.89 2.9 0.8 4.6 1.5 0.98
   Core 5.9 1.6 9.1 3.5 0.91 2.6 0.7 3.6 1.2 0.99
Exchange rates
   REER 0.6 8.3 18.6 -12.0 -0.40 4.6 7.8 22.0 -11.2 0.21
   NEER -2.7 7.3 12.2 -14.6 -0.13 3.1 8.4 19.8 -14.5 0.15
   Won/USD 3.6 6.1 15.0 -8.0 0.90 -2.8 9.6 25.2 -16.1 0.17
   Won/Yen 6.1 15.7 29.6 -29.7 -0.01 -5.4 7.7 13.7 -17.6 0.06
B. External variables
G7 real output 1.8 3.0 6.5 -1.9 0.76 1.4 3.3 5.4 -6.8 0.39
G7 short-term interest rate 4.9 1.1 7.5 3.9 0.93 2.7 1.0 4.3 1.3 0.99
Terms of trade -2.1 11.4 21.0 -20.5 0.03 -4.3 9.3 9.9 -23.0 0.32
Oil price -2.1 11.4 12.1 -28.9 0.14 1.8 10.1 18.3 -19.7 -0.42
Non-oil commodity prices 2.5 17.5 38.4 -17.1 0.48 11.8 16.4 53.3 -15.6 0.42
Note:  Variables reported here are measured as annualised rates of growth between the last quarter of a given semester (H1 or H2) and the last quarter of 
the previous semester. The exceptions are: the call interest rates (in per cent per annum) and output gaps (in per cent), which are both averages for the 
semester in question. An increase in the nominal and real effective exchange rates (NEER and REER, respectively) denotes an appreciation; an increase 
in the bilateral exchange rates denotes a depreciation. The potential output measure used to compute the output gap consists of a Hodrick-Prescott 
trend, calculated separately for each period considered. SD is the standard deviation and AR the first-order serial correlation coefficient.
Sources:  See the main text (section 3).
1991H1 - 1997H1 2000H1 - 2006H2
Table 2. Weights used in central bank loss function
Case ωπ ωy ωdi ωe ωd2 i
A. Standard benchmarks a
   1. Strict inflation targeting 1 0 0 0 0
   2. "Flexible" inflation targeting (Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999) 1 1 0.5 0 0
   3. Heavy (one-period) interest rate smoothing; concern for output 1 1 5 0 0
   4. Heavy (one-period) interest rate smoothing; concern for exchange rate 1 0 5 1 0
   5. Heavy one- and two-period interest rate smoothing 1 0 5 0 5
B. Optimisation-based measures b
   6. Optimal interest path 0.309 0 0.691 0 0
   7. Optimal interest path constrained by setting wdi=0 0 0 0.691 0 0
a) For standard benchmarks, weights are normalised so that the inflation weight equals one.
b) For optimal interest rates (Case 6), weights are normalised to add up to one. Weights ωy and ωe are not found to be significantly different from zero, while 
two-period smoothing is not considered for optimisation purposes; thus, ωy, ωe and ωd2 i are all set to zero. Measure 7 obtains by setting ωπ to zero.
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Table 3. Correlation matrix for different call interest rate paths
it ît it
1 it
2 it
3 it
4 it
5 it
6 it
7
it 1
ît 0.974 1
it
1 0.380 0.471 1
it
2 0.925 0.971 0.596 1
it
3 0.979 0.997 0.464 0.975 1
it
4 0.881 0.944 0.625 0.963 0.937 1
it
5 0.991 0.993 0.422 0.956 0.996 0.917 1
it
6 0.984 0.996 0.436 0.963 0.999 0.927 0.998 1
it
7 0.697 0.601 -0.286 0.429 0.610 0.370 0.659 0.644 1
The interest rate paths featuring in this Table are: i t denotes actual interest rates; î t are fitted values from the unrestricted policy rule; and i t
κ correspond
to cases κ=1,…,7 in Table 1 (with κ=1,…,5 being rule-of-thumb benchmarks, and κ=6,7 corresponding to optimisation-based interest rate paths). Bold 
figures indicate correlation coefficients below 0.9. Correlations are computed over the longest possible period, namely, 1999:6 - 2006:12.
Table 4. Estimates of central bank objective function parameters
ωπ
ωy
ωe
The reported weights, together with those put on one- and two-period interest rate smoothing, must add
up to one. Two-period smoothing is not considered for optimisation purposes; thus ωd2i = 0. Moreover, 
since ωy and ωe are both statistically insignificant, we set them to zero. The point estimate for ωdi thus
equals 0.691.
point estimate t-statistic p-value
0.309 0.0032.964
0.203
0.571
0.020
0.002
1.274
0.566
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Figure 1. The inflation record, 1991-2005
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Figure 2. Actual and simulated call interest rates 
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Figure 3. Actual and simulated call interest rates
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Figure 4. Actual and simulated call interest rates
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Table A.1. Interest rate rules implied by different policy objective weights
State variable        ît it
1 it
2 it
3 it
4 it
5 it
6 it
7
First lag of dependent variable      1.0438 * * * 0 0.9123 0.9698 0.8796 0.6058 0.9864 0.9950
Second lag of dependent variable -0.1609 0 0 0 0 0.3777 0 0
yt 0.0004 101.6346 0.1441 0.0176 0.3188 0.0036 0.0041 0.0006
yt-1 0.0049 103.2460 0.0076 0.0009 0.0015 0 0.0006 0
yt-2 -0.0006 90.0093 0.0024 0.0004 0.0016 0 0.0005 0
yt-3 0.0008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
πt 0.0550 2514.6333 0.0717 0.0109 0.0522 0.0024 0.0142 0.0001
πt-1 0.0356 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
πt-2 -0.0954 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
πt-3    0.0135 * * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
et -0.0011 13.4149 0.0009 0.0002 0.5776 0.0058 0.0031 0.0011
et-1 0.0050 -3.9547 -0.0003 0 -0.1701 -0.0017 -0.0009 -0.0003
et-2 -0.0027 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
et-3 0.0057 65.6551 0 0 0.0017 0 0.0009 0
yt
G7    0.0464 * * -15.3290 1.0864 0.2042 0.4599 0.0130 0.0311 0.0018
yt-1
G7 -0.0117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
it
G7 0.0779 0 0 0 -0.0111 0 0 0
it-1
G7 -0.1418 0.5579 0 0 0.0299 0.0002 0.0001 0
hwwat -0.0068 62.9032 0.0191 0.0037 0.0069 0 0.0075 0
hwwat-1    0.0126 
*
 
*
75.2305 0.0019 0.0003 0.0011 0 0.0004 0
hwwat-2   -0.0096 
*
 
*
65.5855 0 0 0.0012 0 0.0004 0
oilt -0.0006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
oilt-1 -0.0005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
tott-1 -0.0003 6.9957 0.0005 0.0001 0.2886 0.0030 0.0016 0.0006
See the footnote in Table 2 for a description of the different interest rate paths. For the unconstrained estimate of the policy rule (column labelled  î t), */**/***
denote statistical significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Values below 0.0001 are rounded to zero in order to facilitate visual inspection of the Table.
Figure A.1. Actual, estimated and simulated call interest rates 
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